Police reform implementation has been widespread in post-conflict transitions. Responding to conflict recurrence and past human rights violations, among other factors, motivate reforms. However, we know little about the effectiveness of reforms in reducing police propensity for violence. How does police reform affect police violence after armed conflict? I argue that the nature of reforms poses a challenge to peace and stability: police reform may aggravate the problems it seeks to resolve. Increasing deterrent capacity reinforces militarization, a logic of organization to produce violence that accountability mechanisms – the generation of information and the imposition of costs on abuses – are unlikely to curb. I test these propositions on a panel of 55 post-conflict countries between 1985 and 2015. My findings challenge research suggesting that security reforms lead to peace. Results support policies that reduce police’s propensity to use force. Implications are relevant for domestic and international actors engaged in police reform.
This was originally published on SAGE Publications Ltd: Journal of Peace Research: Table of Contents.
