This article theoretically clarifies and presents the first large-N empirical support for a centuries-old intuition: that democracies are slow to use violent military force. It argues that democratic and nondemocratic state leaders managing interstate crises experience trade-offs over when to respond, and that democratic institutions incentivize democrats that consider violent military force to delay. The article presents a simplified account of leader choice during crisis and highlights two mechanisms rooted in external and internal politics that may drive delay. Analyses of nearly 950 states experiencing crisis provide support for expectations. Democracy is associated with a roughly 40% lower likelihood of responding to a crisis at any given point in time, conditional on responding with violence. Two illustrative case studies probe the plausibility of the proposed mechanisms. Taken together, the theory and findings illuminate the processes leaders engage as they consider abandoning negotiating tables at home and abroad in favor of the battlefield.
This was originally published on SAGE Publications Ltd: Journal of Peace Research: Table of Contents.
