Moderate (or ‘limited’) rebel goals and inclusive political institutions have been suggested to increase the chances of rebel–government negotiations. This article attempts to shed light on the politics of rebel–government negotiations by presenting new, systematic data on the scope of rebel goals and demonstrating both theoretically and empirically that it is the interaction of moderate rebel goals and inclusive political institutions – rather than each variable in isolation – that helps disputants overcome bargaining problems and engage in negotiations. Particularly, the article contends that while moderate rebel goals allow the disputants to recognize that negotiations may be mutually beneficial, the presence of a dual commitment problem – where rebel groups and governments are both concerned about the opponent’s commitment to negotiated settlements – hinders them from negotiating. In such cases, the institutional features of polyarchy, defined by Dahl as competitive and inclusive elections accompanied by civil liberties, alleviate this dual commitment problem and induce moderate rebels and the government to follow through with their incentives to negotiate. Statistical results from newly collected data on rebel group goals and rebel–government negotiations support this claim: rebel–government negotiations are significantly more likely to occur when rebel groups espouse moderate goals and the level of polyarchy in a country is sufficiently high. Results indicate that the influence of rebel goals and institutions on negotiations is better understood in conjunction.
This was originally published on SAGE Publications Ltd: Journal of Peace Research: Table of Contents.
